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This paper provides insight on how a modern system of private electronic money would work 
and how the necessary network shall function. We present a model with two types of private 
electronic currencies with one being local, and the other being global. Both of them display 
transactional advantages and dominate fiat money in rate of return. However, in spite of these 
different returns, the two electronic currencies and fiat money circulate in equilibrium. We further 
observe that the local electronic currency can be sold with a premium or with a discount, 
depending on several factors including the probability of relocation faced by the agents in this 
economy. The higher the probability of relocation, the higher is this discount, and the lower the 
share of the local electronic currency in the young creditors’ portfolio. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we introduce and model a new concept of private electronic money. One of 
the main defining characteristics of this new type of electronic currency is that it is not a 
surrogate of fiat money. We do so in the context of a closed production economy with a 
payments system where agents face the possibility of relocation. We build from 
Townsend (1980), the basic payments system delineated by Freeman (1996) and from the 
literature of bank-runs as modified by Smith and others [for a recent example, see Gomis-
Porqueras and Smith (2003)] from the basic Diamond-Dybvig model (1983). We then 
introduce private electronic currencies and modify accordingly the fashion in which debt 
is settled and payments are made in the payments system in an attempt to answer the 
following questions: what are the characteristics that these private electronic currencies 
must have in order for them to circulate? Can these electronic currencies circulate 
together with fiat money? Under which circumstances is this possible? And what are the 
characteristics that the network needs to have for the introduction of these currencies to 
be successful? 
There have been extremely valuable recent contributions to the theoretical 
literature of private electronic money. Among these attempts, the papers by Williamson 
(1999) and Temzelides and Williamson (2001) provide us with remarkable insight. Both 
papers use the approach of a random matching model with infinitely lived agents, where 
all currencies are indivisible. Private money takes the form of a medium of exchange 
issued by financial intermediaries. Also, transaction costs, informational frictions, and 
related factors are the main factors explaining the discounts observed when trading 
different private currencies. However, as argued convincingly by Schreft (2001), even 
though the models offered by Williamson (1999) and Temzelides and Williamson (2001) 
are a very good representation of how the financial system worked during the 19
th 
century, they do not provide a clear insight on how a modern system of private electronic 
money would work and how the necessary network shall function. Interestingly, 
Williamson (1999) and Temzelides and Williamson (2001) provide a very good analysis 
and interpretation regarding, for example, the private banking notes circulating in the 
Suffolk Banking System, as presented by Rolnick and Weber (1988), Rolnick, Smith and 
Weber (1998), and Smith and Weber (1998). We understand this to be a very interesting   3 
departing point by its own right. Thus, in their environment, private banknotes are debt 
and, at the end of the day, they take the form of privately issued fiat money, or, in other 
words, a surrogate of fiat money. 
The recent advancements in electronic commerce are enormous. As of today, 
several companies are exploring a next step that would increase the potential use of the 
Internet: electronic micropayments and a clearinghouse to account for these transactions. 
It is said that approximately forty percent of today’s online companies would sell 
contents they are currently giving away if they had a viable micropayment system. As an 
example, people could sell many different new creations on the Internet if only 
mechanisms existed to facilitate small payments. However, the main problem faced today 
is that transaction costs, such as fees from banks and credit card companies erase any 
profit. Companies such as Peppercoin are working in the introduction of easier-to-use 
technology that allows web sites to accept tiny payments by effectively processing them 
in batches, thereby cutting down on bank fees
1.  
As far as we know, almost all of today’s existing electronic moneys are 
surrogates of fiat money: they are denominated in fiat currency, and their values fluctuate 
with the value of the denominating currency. More importantly, they are fiat in the sense 
there is no backing of these electronic moneys, and thus they are not redeemable to the 
issuers. Firms like BitPass
2 allow web surfers to set up accounts with US dollars charged 
to a credit card or internet money-exchange service such as PayPal, and make 
micropayments from such accounts. However, in our mind, these firms act more like a 
payment intermediary rather than an electronic money issuer. In our eyes, a true 
electronic money issuer would be some firm who issues electronic money in its own 
denomination. 
Modeling an object and an institution whose time is coming close but do not exist 
yet in its full form presents a very difficult task. As we mentioned before, the work of 
Williamson (1998) and Temzelides and Williamson (2001) constitute a strong point from 
which future efforts have to build. Future successful attempts must be able to provide 
useful insight on the proper mechanisms to be designed within the payments system. It is 
                                                 
1  See  http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/32440.html and Bergstein (2003) for a more 
comprehensive account. 
2 See https://www.bitpass.com for more information.   4 
our point of view that success would need a more comprehensive effort than just that of 
theoretical monetary economics. It is for this reason that in this paper we present the 
results of the combined effort of two disciplines: Macro/Monetary Economics and 
Management and Information Systems (MIS). 
We propose a form of private electronic currency issued by firms who have the 
capability of doing so profitably, as opposed to financial intermediaries. This electronic 
currency constitutes debt issued by the firm, but at the same time, it is an advanced sale 
of the commodity (or basket of commodities) produced by such a firm. Thus, circulating 
private electronic currency, as we understand it, is a  circulating real option that 
consumers can exercise or otherwise use as a t ransactional medium. Because of the 
positive network externalities involved in this type of trade, this advanced sale of 
commodities is different from that of traditional commodities. First, for this externality to 
be present, there have to be some transactional advantages: a divisible currency that can 
be used in transactions of arbitrarily large or small size at a very low cost, and a currency 
that provides privacy and anonymity to consumers who require them to perform specific 
transactions. The latter can be considered as necessary although not sufficient conditions. 
Second, in the case of traditional commodities, consumers decide whether to purchase 
them or not simply based upon the usefulness of these commodities. However, in the case 
of the private electronic currency that we propose, a consumer’s choice of whether to 
acquire it or not takes also in consideration whether other agents in the economy are 
accepting it or not. Thus, this private electronic currency takes the form of some sort of 
commodity money which uses the issuer’s products as its backing. However, the people’s 
beliefs on the issuer’s willingness and ability to honor its promised advanced sale will 
also play a very important role on the consumer’s decision to acquire this currency. 
There are, at least, two additional issues that must be addressed. First, there is the 
issue of whether or not alternative private electronic currencies can circulate 
simultaneously, with some of them being local, as posed by Schreft (2001). What is the 
meaning  of an electronic currency being local and what are the requirements of the 
implied network? Second, there is the issue of both electronic currencies and fiat money 
circulating in equilibrium. We take the view that different currencies circulate in   5 
equilibrium because they provide for different needs, in spite of having different rates of 
return. 
We thus propose a simple environment to reproduce how payments are settled in 
the economy. We focus on the two issues mentioned above and thus, we abstract from the 
complicated dynamic nature of contracting that considering agents with infinite lives 
would imply. We consider then heterogeneous agents with finite lives that are spatially 
separated in two outer locations, in the spirit of Townsend (1980), Freeman (1996) and 
Gomis-Porqueras and Smith (2003). However, the interpretation that we give to locations 
does not relate necessarily to space but rather to different networks or Internet 
communities. There have to be different outer locations or Internet communities, at least 
two types of electronic currencies, and agents facing the possibility of relocation if we 
want to be able to address the issue of alternative electronic currencies circulating and 
local electronic currencies. There is also a centralized location  or network in this 
economy where clearing is present and contracts can be enforced. This centralized 
network, as apposed to outer networks, relates to a very well established network or 
community, with high entry barriers and strong enforcement mechanisms
3. In an 
environment like the one we consider, the possibility of clearing and supervised trade in 
secondary markets for currencies could prove to be welfare improving. 
We propose a model with the characteristic mentioned above where there are two 
types of firms that can issue each, a specific type of electronic currency (this currency 
cannot be issued by anybody else in the economy) denominated in its own units. Each 
type of this privately issued electronic currency represents not only debt issued by the 
producer to finance investment but also an advanced sale of the commodities produced 
by the corresponding type of firm: it is redeemable in the future in the exclusive 
commodity (or bundle of commodities) produced by that type of firm. However, only one 
type of electronic currency is accepted in both outer networks. Thus, the second 
electronic currency will be the one that we call the “local” electronic currency. The cost 
for consumers of accepting and carrying holdings of a given type of electronic currency 
from one period to the next is arbitrarily low due to the presence of the network 
externalities mentioned before. In addition, a stock of perfectly divisible fiat money 
                                                 
3 See Parameswaran, Susarla and Whinston (2001) for a deeper analysis of the mentioned networks.   6 
issued by the monetary authority circulates in the economy. The cost for consumers of 
accepting and holding fiat money from one period to the next (inflation) is higher than 
that of an electronic currency. Thus, in this environment fiat money is dominated in rate 
of return by the electronic currencies. However, the motive for agents in the economy to 
hold fiat money is given by a legal restriction imposing that taxes must be paid using this 
currency. 
We offer a model with what we call  intentional matching.  The concept of 
intentional matching that we use in this paper differs from the one mentioned by Schreft 
(2001), in the following sense: different types of agents meet and exchange because it is 
in their best interest, given the physical environment and the structure of trade and travel 
patterns. In equilibrium, consumers hold both types of electronic money together with fiat 
money. Fiat money is always needed to pay taxes. However, as mentioned before, some 
agents face the possibility of relocation, and this event will be known only after they have 
the chance of choosing their portfolio of currencies. The latter implies that agents hold 
both types of electronic currency and that they later will look for the possibility of trading 
them depending on whether they have to relocate or not. It will be observed in 
equilibrium that the “local” electronic currency will be traded for the other electronic 
currency at a discount. We consider and delineate an environment general enough to 
allow for the transactional advantage of privacy and anonymity provided by electronic 
currencies. However, at this initial stage of our research we abstract from such 
possibility. This will be developed in the next stage of this research project. At this stage, 
we also abstract from the issue of willingness and ability by the issuers to hold to their 
promise, and leave this also for a later stage of our research. Thus, firms are willing and 
able to produce enough goods to honor all of their outstanding electronic currency. Also, 
all consumers exercise their real option and redeem all its holding of private electronic 
currency. 
One of the main contributions of this paper is the introduction of a new type of 
private electronic currency, nonexistent yet but to be expected in the very near future. 
This type of currency shows to have desirable properties and positive network 
externalities, and it would circulate both as a complement and substitute of fiat money. 
We are one step ahead, then, and we can make ourselves ready about what to expect. This   7 
implies the need for a change on the way in which debt and payments are settled in the 
economy, and presents interesting challenges to both law makers and policy makers on 
how to design new settlement rules, how to regulate and supervise the financial system 
and the elements needed for this regulation and supervision to be a successful one. 
We also study how the properties displayed by the equilibrium in this economy 
change according to different parameters of the system, such as different redemption 
rates of electronic currencies offered by firms, the transactional cost of electronic money 
and the inflation rate. In this sense, this paper has another important contribution: given 
the stylized nature of the model presented here, an experiment can be later designed and 
implemented in a laboratory, in order to provide insight to policy makers and potential 
future issuers of electronic money on the requirements that the design and 
implementation of such a network has within the payments system. 
Finally, we should mention that this model could be extended to an open economy 
version, by, for example, considering one of the outer locations as a foreign location with 
a different fiat currency and introducing a market for foreign exchange. However, 
additional issues related to network design and regulation would arise and we abstract 
from them at this initial stage of our research. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the 
general environment and the structure of the payments system. Next, in Section 3 we 
describe the incentives and behavior of the different types of agents that populate this 
economy. In Section 4 we present the market clearing and aggregate consistency 
conditions and in Section 5 we describe the properties displayed by equilibria in this 
environment. Finally, in Section 6 we present the main conclusions of our research and 
delineate future related research. 
 
2. Environment 
Consider a closed, production economy with overlapping generations of two-period lived 
agents. Time is discrete and indexed by t=0, 1, 2, … Each generation is composed of 
heterogeneous agents. One of the main features of this model is that a group of these 
agents are only dedicated to the production of producer-type-specific composite final 
goods. In particular, we consider two types of producers in this economy, and we will call   8 
them Microsoft producers and Kleenex producers, respectively, for reasons that will 
become apparent later. In addition, there is a group of agents who own a specific good 
whose consumption requires privacy and anonymity. We will label this good as good X, 
and the agents who own it will be called X-men, accordingly. 
There are two outer networks or communities that are separated. These two 
networks surround a Central Network (or Central Island, as called in the payments system 
literature). Five types of agents are born in one of these two communities each period. In 
the first community there are four types of agents, which we will henceforth call 
creditors, X-men, Microsoft producers and Kleenex producers. In the second community 
there is a single type of agents, which we will henceforth call Network 2 agents. 
Population is constant and each generation has the same composition. A continuum with 
unit mass of agents of each type is born each period. There is a generation of initial old 
agents (creditors) endowed with the initial supply of fiat money M0. 
In addition, there is a Central Network. The Central Community is a well 
established network and think of it as where the civil and economic authority is located. 
All contracts can be enforced in the Central Network, and entry barriers are very high. 















Figure 1: Central Network and Outer Networks 















Central Network   9 
At this point, it will be useful to have an overview of this economy. There are five 
goods each period: the creditors’ endowment good, good X, the Network-2-specific good, 
the Microsoft composite final good and the Kleenex composite final good. Each 
composite final good can be thought of as a bundle of commodities produced by each 
producer. In addition, there are two types of physical capital each period: the Microsoft-
specific physical capital and the Kleenex-specific physical capital. There are two types of 
labor each period: Microsoft-specific labor and Kleenex-specific labor. There are three 
types of currency: fiat money, Microsoft private electronic money and Kleenex private 
electronic money. Fiat money is issued by the monetary authority of this economy and, 
by definition, is not redeemable. Taxes must be paid using fiat money. Private producers 
issue private electronic money. Thus, Microsoft electronic money is issued only by 
Microsoft producers and it is redeemable in the Microsoft composite final good. Kleenex 
electronic money is issued only by Kleenex producers and it is redeemable in the Kleenex 
composite final good. Notice that Kleenex electronic money is what we will call the local 
electronic currency. 
 
2.1 Private Electronic Currencies and the Networks 
As we mentioned before, almost all of the electronic currencies existing today are 
surrogates of fiat money: they are denominated in fiat currency, and their values fluctuate 
with the value of the denominating currency. The form of private electronic currency that 
we propose is issued by firms who have the capability of doing so profitably, as opposed 
to financial intermediaries. There are several advantages with this revolutionary 
electronic money: its value will not be fluctuating with fiat currencies any more, but 
instead it will depend upon the value of commodity bundle backing it. In some sense, this 
type of electronic currency belongs to commodity money: like gold and silver, it is now 
the product bundle that serves as the anchor. Freed from financial risk, this new form of 
electronic money should have the potential of being a currency with more stable value 
than fiat currency. As the money for the Internet, it has the potential to become a global 
currency by eliminating the need for foreign exchange. This is also why in our minds the 
issuer should be some firms which are world-wide recognized, like Microsoft. In this   10 
sense, the existing form  of electronic money e -gold
4 has the flavor of what we are 
proposing: e-gold users’ account balance are denominated in various precious metals, it 
enables people to make payment with specific weights of gold. However, notice that 
while the limited availability of gold serves as the mechanism to stabilize its value, it also 
disables gold to serve as the world’s global currency. In fact, that is exactly the same 
cause for the breakdown of Bretton Woods System. In contrast, the form of electronic 
money we are proposing has the ability to become a global currency. Notice, however, 
that the mechanism that would stabilize its value is not the limited availability of the 
commodities backing these currencies. Instead, the value-stabilizing mechanism would 
be given by the issuer’s profit-maximizing incentive to keep its product bundle’s value 
and maintain its reputation as an issuer. 
Technically speaking, for any electronic money to be accepted by the public, three 
problems must be solved: security, privacy and low cost. Above all, open networks like 
the Internet need to generate  trust in an electronic environment, thus the kernel of 
electronic payment is its security. Cryptographic security mechanisms, including data 
encryption and digital signature schemes, are often  used to provide security for the 
transaction. Also, privacy has become a much bigger concern in today’s information 
world: despite its potential flaw
5, an ideal electronic money should have the same 
property as cash, which can provide anonymity for the consumer. This problem is usually 
solved by the use of zero-knowledge proofs. Last but not the least, the wide acceptance of 
electronic money also hinges critically on the issuer’s ability to provide a low cost 
currency, especially for the micropayments. So far, most of the research on decreasing 
the cost has been focusing on reducing the computational intensiveness of public key 
operations. However, there are also economic and judicial ways to reduce the cost. It is 
based on these engineering characteristics of electronic money that we explicitly model 
as privacy and low cost in our environment. Although security is not explicitly mentioned 
in our model, it is also implied since security is often associated with privacy. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See http://www.e-gold.com/ for more information. 
5 There is wide concern that this anonymous currency can be a “safe heaven” for criminal activities such as 
money laundering, and blackmailing.   11 
2.2 Endowments and Preferences 
Each young creditor is endowed with y units of a specific endowment good. Old creditors 
have no endowment. Young Microsoft producers have no endowments of goods but they 
have exclusive access to an investment technology that allows them to transform one unit 
of the creditors’ endowment good at time t into one unit of Microsoft-specific capital at 
time t+1. Old Microsoft producers are endowed with one unit of Microsoft-specific labor. 
Also, old Microsoft producers have exclusive access to a constant returns to scale 
production technology that transforms the Microsoft-specific capital stock they got from 
last period ( )
M
t K and Microsoft-specific labor ( )
M
t L 1 + into the Microsoft-specific composite 
final good. 
M
t K  is essential in the production of the Microsoft composite final good. To 








t L K , 
where  1 0 < <a . In addition, for simplicity we assume that old Microsoft producers work 
only for themselves and, thus,  1 1 = +
M
t L . 
Young Kleenex producers have no endowments of goods but they have exclusive 
access to an investment technology that allows them to transform one unit of the 
creditors’ endowment good at time t into one unit of Kleenex-specific capital at time t+1. 
Old Kleenex producers are endowed with one unit of Kleenex-specific labor. Also, old 
Kleenex producers have exclusive access to a constant returns to scale production 
technology that transforms the Kleenex-specific capital stock they got from last period 
( )
K
t K and Microsoft-specific labor ( )
K
t L 1 + into the Microsoft-specific composite final good. 
To fix ideas, we let the Kleenex-specific production function take  the form 








t L K , where  1 0 < < b . Also for simplicity we assume that old Kleenex 
producers work only for themselves and, thus,  1 1 = +
K
t L . 
X-men are endowed with w units of good X when young and with nothing when 
old. Finally, young Network 2 agents are endowed with e units of a Network-2-specific 
good that we will call nuts, for simplicity. Old Network 2 agents have no endowments.   12 
Creditors do not derive utility of consuming when young. They face the 
possibility of relocation when old in the following way
6: with probability p , and old 
creditor must relocate to Network 2. If an old creditor born at t does relocate, she derives 
utility only from consuming nuts ( )
n
t c 1 + , which are the Network-2 specific endowment 
good. However, with probability ( ) p - 1  an old creditor does not have to relocate, and she 
can stay in Network 1. If an old creditor born at t does not relocate, she derives utility 
from consuming the Microsoft composite final good ( )
M
t c 1 + , the Kleenex composite final 
good ( )
K
t c 1 + , the creditors’ endowment good ( )
c
t c 1 +  and good X ( )
x
t c 1 + . Thus, the expected 
lifetime utility of a creditor born at t is of the form 










t c c c c v c u 1 1 1 1 1 , , , 1 + + + + + - + p p   (1) 
where  u u ¢ < < ¢ ¢ 0 ,  1 11 0 v v < < ,  2 22 0 v v < < ,  3 33 0 v v < <  and  4 44 0 v v < < . Both  () ￿ u  and 
() ￿ v  satisfy the Inada conditions. We further assume, for simplicity, that  () ￿ v  is additively 
separable, but this assumption is not required. 
X-men derive utility only from consuming the Microsoft composite final good 
( )
M
t h  and the Kleenex composite final good ( )
K
t h when young. Thus, the lifetime utility 




t h h a , , where  1 11 0 a a < <  and  2 22 0 a a < < . 
Microsoft producers derive utility only from consuming the Microsoft composite final 
good when old ( ) 1 + t g . Hence, the lifetime utility of a Microsoft producer born at t is 
given by  ( ) 1 + t g i , where  i i ¢ < < ¢ ¢ 0 . Kleenex producers derive utility only from 
consuming the Kleenex composite final good when old ( ) 1 + t b . The lifetime utility of a 
Kleenex producer born at t is given by  ( ) 1 + t b j , where  j j ¢ < < ¢ ¢ 0 . Finally, Network 2 
agents derive utility only from consuming the Microsoft  composite final good when 
young ( ) t l . Thus, the lifetime utility of a Network 2 agent born at t is given by  ( ) t l o , 




                                                 
6 We borrow from the relocation literature of bank runs, introduced by Bruce D. Smith.   13 
2.3 Trade and Travel Patterns 
Each period has two parts. In the first part of the period both intra- and inter-generational 
trade takes place: young agents trade with other young agents in the outer networks, old 
agents trade with other old agents in the Central Network, and young agents trade with 
old agents in the outer networks. During the second part of period intra- and 
intergenerational trade takes place: old agents trade with other old agents in the outer 
networks and young agents trade with old agents in the outer networks. We now explain 
in detail these transactions. 
Young agents, first part of the period 
During the first part of the period, young Microsoft producers issue Microsoft electronic 
money and exchange it for the creditors’ endowment good, which they need for 
investment. One unit of Microsoft electronic money is a promise made by a young 
Microsoft producer to pay 
M r  units of the Microsoft composite final good next period. 
At the same time, the young Kleenex producers issue Kleenex electronic money and 
exchange it for the creditors’ endowment good, which they need for investment. One unit 
of Kleenex electronic money is a promise made by a young Kleenex producer to pay 
K r  
units of the Kleenex composite final good next period. Holding one unit of electronic 
money (either Microsoft money or Kleenex money) from one period to the other is 
costly: the electronic money holding lose value at the rate e . However, by assumption, 
the cost of holding electronic money is lower than the cost of holding fiat currency. The 
young creditors will accept the electronic money issued by the Microsoft young 
producers and by the Kleenex young producers in exchange for part of their endowment 
good. The remainder of the young creditors’ endowment will be exchanged for fiat 
money. Creditors must use fiat money to pay a lump-sum tax of  1 t  goods next period, 
measured in terms of the creditors’ endowment good. 
The Microsoft young producers take the creditors’ endowment good they 
purchased and invest it into the Microsoft-specific physical capital. Similarly, the 
Kleenex young producers take the creditors’ endowment good they purchased and invest 
it into the Kleenex-specific physical capital.   14 
Old agents, first part of the period 
During the first part of the period, all the old creditors must travel to the Central Network. 
Old creditors use their holdings of fiat money to pay the tax they owe to the economic 
authority. At this moment, while on the Central Network, the old creditors learn whether 
they must relocate or not. If an old creditor must relocate, her holdings of Kleenex 
electronic money are of no use to her, since only Microsoft electronic money will be 
accepted in Network 2 (Network 2 agents wish to consume only the Microsoft composite 
final good). However, an old creditor who does not relocate has use for both Microsoft 
and Kleenex electronic money. At this point, a secondary market for electronic currencies 
opens: old creditors who must relocate will sell their holdings of Kleenex electronic 
money to the old creditors who do not relocate, in exchange for Microsoft electronic 
money. Let  t q  denote the price of one unit of Kleenex electronic money in terms of 
Microsoft electronic money at t. After these transactions take place, the old agents who 
do not relocate receive a transfer of  t , 2 t  units of fiat money from the monetary authority. 
Later, all the old creditors who do not relocate go back to Network 1 and all the old 
creditors who relocate travel to Network 2. 
Young with old agents, first part of the period 
The old creditors who do not relocate go back to Network 1. Here, they use the fiat 
money they bring from the Central Island to purchase the creditors’ endowment good 
from the young creditors. 
Second part of the period 
The old Microsoft producers use the Microsoft-specific physical capital and their labor to 
produce the Microsoft composite final good. They have to produce enough of the good to 
stand ready to pay back to all the agents who show up with the Microsoft electronic 
money they issued last period. Similarly, the old Kleenex producers use the Kleenex-
specific physical capital and their labor to produce the Kleenex composite final good. 
They also have to produce enough of the good to stand ready to pay back to all the agents 
who show up with the Kleenex electronic money they issued last period. 
The old creditors who relocate, once in Network 2, use their holdings of 
Microsoft electronic money to purchase nuts from the young Network 2 agents. The 
young Network 2 agents then travel to Network 1 and use (redeem) their holdings of   15 
Microsoft electronic money to obtain and consume the Microsoft composite final good 
from the old Microsoft producers. 
The old creditors who do not relocate use part of their holdings of Microsoft 
electronic money and Kleenex electronic money to secretly and anonymously purchase 
good X. The young X-men exchange their good for electronic currency. Later, the young 
X-men use their holdings of Microsoft electronic money to purchase the Microsoft 
composite final good from the old Microsoft producers and consume it, while they use 
their holdings of Kleenex electronic money to purchase the Kleenex composite final good 
from the old Kleenex producers and consume it. 
The old creditors use the remainder of their holdings of Microsoft electronic 
money to purchase the Microsoft composite final good from the old Microsoft producers. 
They also use the remainder of their holdings of Kleenex electronic money to purchase 
the Kleenex composite final good from the old Kleenex producers. 
The old Microsoft producers consume whatever is left of the Microsoft composite 
final good that they produced, and the old Kleenex producers whatever is left of the 
Kleenex composite final good that they produced. 
It is important to mention at this point that, in order to gain insight of the 
fundamental properties displayed by equilibria with three types of currency circulating in 
this environment, in the remainder of this preliminary version of the paper, we depart 
from the general setup of the model and solve the case where there is no good X or X-
men. As a consequence, equation (1) is modified accordingly: 








t c c c v c u 1 1 1 1 , , 1 + + + + - + p p   (1’) 
 
3. Agents’ Behavior 
3.1 Creditors   
Consider a creditor born at t. Let  t m  denote the nominal holdings of fiat money by a 








denote her nominal holdings of Microsoft electronic 
money and Kleenex electronic money, respectively. Let also t P denote the price of the 
creditors’ endowment good in terms of fiat money at t, and 
M
t P and 
K
t P  denote the price   16 
of the creditor’s endowment good in terms of Microsoft electronic money and Kleenex 
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  In this environment, since taxes must be paid using fiat money, a young creditor 
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where e  is the cost of holding electronic money between t  and  1 + t , and 1 , 2 + t t  is the 
nominal monetary transfer received from monetary authority by the old creditors who do 






+ denotes the nominal holdings of Microsoft electronic money by 






+ denotes her nominal holdings of Kleenex 
electronic money.   17 
  The budget constraint (5) reflects the fact that an old creditor can purchase the 
Microsoft composite final good only with Microsoft electronic money. The budget 
constraint (6) reflects the fact that an old creditor can purchase the Kleenex composite 
final good only with Kleenex electronic money. The budget constraint (7) reflects this old 
creditor’s transactions in the secondary market for electronic money with old creditors 
who must relocate. Finally, the budget constraint (8) indicates that an old creditor who 
does not relocate uses fiat money t o purchase the young creditors’ endowment good 
(since her holdings of electronic money cannot be redeemed into her endowment good 
afterwards). 









































+ denotes her holdings of Kleenex electronic money. 
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t c 1 +  in order to maximize her 
lifetime utility (1’) subject to (4), (5), (8), (12) and (13). Let l be the Lagrange multiplier 
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p p   (16) 







q = +1   (17) 
Also, combining (16) and (17) yields: 
( )















  (18) 
 
3.2 Microsoft Producers 
Consider a Microsoft producer born at t. Recall that  1 + t g  denotes the consumption of 
























units of the creditors’ endowment good she purchased into Microsoft-specific physical 



















units of the Microsoft 
composite final good. Part of her production will be used to repay the holders of the 





1 e - . She will use the 
remainder of her production for her own consumption. Thus, an old Microsoft producer 
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taking  , ,e
M
t P and 

























P E   (21) 
 
3.3 Kleenex Producers 
Consider a Kleenex producer born at t. Recall that  1 + t b  denotes the consumption of the 
























units of the creditors’ endowment good s he purchased into Kleenex-specific physical 



















units of the Kleenex 
composite final good. She will use part of her production to repay the holders of the 





1 e - . She will use the 
remainder of her production for her own consumption. Thus, an old Kleenex producer 
































in order to maximize her life-




































  (23) 
taking  , ,e
K
t P and 

























P E   (24) 
 
3.4 Network 2 Agents 
Consider a Network 2 agent born at t. A young Network 2 agent sells her endowment of 
nuts in exchange for Microsoft electronic money. Later, the young Network 2 agent uses 
her holdings of Microsoft electronic money to purchase the Microsoft composite final 
good  t l . Let 
M
t L denote the nominal holdings of Microsoft electronic money by a young 
Network 2 agent at t, and  t n  denote the price of nuts in terms of Microsoft electronic 
money. Thus, a young Network 2 agent faces the following budget constraint: 
e n L t
M




t L r l =   (26) 
A young Network 2 agent wants to maximize her lifetime utility: 
( ) e n r o t
M   (27) 
 
3.5 The Government 
The monetary authority in this economy prints fiat money at the real net rate s . Thus, 
the nominal supply of fiat money evolves according to: 
( ) t t M M s + = + 1 1 ,  0 0 > M   (28) 
Also, the government collects taxes from old creditors and gives monetary transfers to 
old creditors who do not relocate. 
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4. Market Clearing Conditions 
In our model, because of the relocation, a secondary market for electronic money will 
emerge between the old creditors who are and are not relocated. Since for those creditors 
who are relocated, Kleenex electronic money is useless, they exchange all their holdings 
of this currency for Microsoft electronic money, which is the only useful transactional 
medium in Network 2. The creditors who are not relocated will accept the Kleenex 
electronic money because they will be able to redeem it and consume the Kleenex 
composite good. 


























- -   (29) 
where  1 + t q  is the exchange rate which clears the secondary market: it is the price of a unit 
of Kleenex electronic money in terms of Microsoft electronic money. If  , 1 1 < + t q  it means 
that Kleenex electronic money is sold at a discount. 
In the primary market for Microsoft electronic money, the demand should equal 






t E E E = =
^ ~
  (30) 
Equivalently, in the primary market for Kleenex electronic money, the demand 






t E E E = =
^ ~
  (31) 
Obviously, in the market for fiat money, the following condition holds: 
( ) t t t M m , 2 1 t p - = =   (32) 
That means that the money supply is equally distributed among the old creditors who do 
not relocate. 
Also, Substituting (3) into (32) gives us: 
1 1t + = = t t t P m M ,  ... 2 , 1 , 0 = "t   (33) 













+   (34) 
The real return on fiat money in equilibrium is given by:  









Since  ( )( ) 1 1 1 > + - s e , fiat money is dominated in rate of return by both electronic 
currencies. 
For every young creditor, her endowment good has three uses: it can be used to 
purchase Microsoft electronic money, to purchase Kleenex electronic money, or sold to 
old creditors who are not relocated, in exchange for fiat money that she will be used to 
pay her tax when she travels to the central island the next period. 
Thus, the market for the young creditors’ endowment good clears when 













y   (36) 
Let  t G  denote the total production of Microsoft composite good at t. The market 
for Microsoft composite final good clears when supply equals demand: 
( ) t t
M
t t g l c G + + - = p 1   (37) 
Let  t B  denote the total production of Kleenex composite good at t. The market 
for Kleenex composite final good clears when supply equals demand: 
( ) t
K
t t b c B + - = p 1   (38) 
In Network 2, the consumption of nuts by the relocated old creditors (demand) 
will equal the Network 2 agent’s endowment of coconuts (supply): 
n
t c e ￿ = p   (39) 
  Finally, the following aggregate consistency conditions must hold: 






t E r l c e p - = + - + + 1 1 1 1   (40) 




t E r c e p - = - 1 1   (41) 
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5. Equilibrium 
Combining (4), (21), (24), (30) and (31), and solving for 
K
t P  as a function of 
M












































P P P   (42) 
Combining (4), (21), (29), (30) and (31), and solving for 
M
t c 1 +  as a function of 
M
t P yields: 













































t   (43) 
Combining (13), (21), (24), (30), (31) and (42), and solving for 
K
t c 1 +  as a function of 
M
t P yields: 











































y P c c   (44) 
   Using (42), (43), (44) and (18), we obtain the expression: 















M P c v P P r P c v P r 1 2 1 1 + + =  (45) 
Then, the equilibrium 
M
t P  is such that equation (45) is satisfied. 
In this preliminary version of the property, we illustrate the property displayed by 
equilibria by using a numerical example. In later versions of this paper, we will include 
analytical results. 
Numerical example with a loglinear utility function. To fix ideas, in this section we let 
equation (1’) take the following functional form: 








t c c c c 1 1 1 1 ln ln ln 1 ln + + + + + + - + p p  (46) 
We set the following parameter values across all scenarios:  01 . 0 = e , y=2, and 
e=1. We define three cases as corresponding to the following pairs of ( ) b a, : (0.3,0.2), 
(0.3,0.3) and (0.2,0.3). For each pair  ( ) b a, , we define first eleven scenarios, each 
corresponding to the following values of p: 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 
0.80, 0.90 and 0.99999.Then, for each value of p, we use the following values of s: 0.05,   24 
0.075 and 0.1. Finally, for each value of p and each value of s, we use the following 
pairs of values for ( )
K M r r , : (1.1, 1.05), (1.075, 1.075) and (1.05, 1.1). Thus, we evaluate 
a total of 297 scenarios that we use to analyze the properties of the equilibrium. 
One of the advantages of using a log linear utility function is that it ensures the 
uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium. A second property of the log linear utility 
function is that the different pairs ( )
K M r r ,  considered have no effect on the real holdings 
of each type of electronic currency by a young creditor. But, as we will see later, different 
combinations of ( )
K M r r ,  do affect q, which is the relative price of Kleenex electronic 
money in terms of Microsoft electronic money in the secondary market. 
Let Sm denote the share of real holdings of Microsoft electronic currency in a 
young creditor’s portfolio, and Sk denote the share of real holdings of Kleenex electronic 
currency in a young creditor’s portfolio. We find that Sm is always an increasing function 
of the probability of relocation ( p), while  Sk always decreases as  p increases. This 
property is illustrated in Figure 1. Notice that when the probability of relocation is zero, 
young creditors hold equal amounts, in real terms, of the Kleenex and Microsoft 
electronic currency. In the limit, as p grows close enough to 1, young creditors will hold 
almost nothing of Kleenex currency, but only fiat money and Microsoft electronic 
currency. 
Figure 1: Shares of Microsoft and Kleenex electronic money on the young 


















A second important property of the stationary equilibrium is that, as it should be 
expected, the price of Kleenex electronic currency in terms of Microsoft electronic   25 
currency ( q) decreases as the probability of relocation increases. This property is 
illustrated in Figure 2. In the limit, as p grows close enough to 1, there is no need to hold 
Kleenex electronic currency, and thus its price becomes zero. 
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However, whether Kleenex electronic money will be sold at a discount (q<1) or at 
a premium (q>1) seems to be a more complicated matter. In order to answer this question 
we also need to take into account the relative capital-intensity of each sector and the 
combination of ( )
K M r r , . A summary of results can be found in Tables 1 and 2. 
In Table 1, we consider the case where both electronic currencies have the same 
redemption rates, i.e.: we keep r
M=r
K. This exercise allows us to focus on the effects of 
relative capital intensity across sectors on  q. When the production of the Microsoft 
composite final good is more capital intensive  ) ( b a > , it is possible to observe that the 
Kleenex electronic currency is sold at a premium (q>1) when the probability of relocation 
is low enough. One possible explanation is that, in relative terms, the Kleenex industry 
requires less debt in order to produce. However, if the Kleenex industry is more capital 
intensive  ) ( b a < , the Kleenex currency is always sold at a discount (q<1). 
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In Table 2, we consider the case where both industries have the same capital 
intensity in production: we keep a=b. This exercise allows us to focus on the effects of 
different redemption rates of electronic currencies on q. Only when 
K M r r <  and the 
probability of relocation is low enough, do we observe that Kleenex electronic currency 




Numerical example with a CRRA utility function.  In this section, we use a more 








0.00 0.955 1.000 1.048
0.10 0.829 0.869 0.910
0.20 0.719 0.753 0.789
0.30 0.619 0.648 0.679
0.40 0.527 0.553 0.579
0.50 0.442 0.463 0.486
0.60 0.362 0.379 0.397
0.70 0.283 0.297 0.311
0.80 0.205 0.215 0.225
0.90 0.122 0.127 0.133




p a>b a=b a<b
0.00 1.492 1.000 0.670
0.10 1.283 0.869 0.577
0.20 1.098 0.753 0.496
0.30 0.933 0.648 0.423
0.40 0.783 0.553 0.358
0.50 0.645 0.463 0.298
0.60 0.516 0.379 0.242
0.70 0.393 0.297 0.189
0.80 0.273 0.215 0.136
0.90 0.151 0.127 0.080





k=1.075, s=0.075  27 
We try to answer the question that how the young creditors’ portfolio composition and 
how q change when the creditors become more risk averse. We let equation (1’) take the 
following functional form: 
( )



















































t c c c c
  (47) 
To focus on the effects purely due to electronic monies’ global/local 
characteristics, we keep other properties of electronic currency the same, i.e. 3 . 0 = = b a , 
( )=
K M r r ,  (1.075, 1.075), and use the same parameter values as in the loglinear utility 
case:  01 . 0 = e , y=2,   075 . 0 = s , and e=1. Again, we define first eleven scenarios, each 
corresponding to the following values of p: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 
1. Finally, for each value of p, we change the value of ? from 0.5, 1.5, to 3. Thus, we 
have a total of 33 scenarios that we use to analyze the properties of the equilibrium. Since 
the loglinear utility function is simply one special case of CRRA utility function with 
1 = x , it would be helpful to compare the results from CRRA utility function with those 
from loglinear utility function under the same set of parameter values. 
In each scenario, given  b a = , there is a unique stationary equilibrium. Like in 
the loglinear utility function, the different pairs ( )
K M r r ,  considered still have no effect 
on the real holdings of each type of electronic currency by a young creditor, but they do 
affect q, which is the relative price of Kleenex electronic money in terms of Microsoft 
electronic money in the secondary market. 




As can be observed, for a given relocation probability p , a larger x  is always 
associated with a larger Sm, a smaller Sk, and a smaller q. This result makes perfect sense 
intuitively since for any given relocation probability, a more risk averse creditor will 
want to put a larger fraction of her portfolio into the safer “global” Microsoft electronic 
money, and reduce her real holding of the “local” Kleenex electronic money; therefore, 
the price of Kleenex electronic money in terms of Microsoft money in the secondary 
market will be lower when the creditors become more risk averse.  
Figure 3. Shares of Microsoft and Kleenex electronic    
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Figure 4. Price of Kleenex electronic money in terms of 













x =3   29 
Another thing to notice is that in all these scenarios, q is always smaller than 1, 
which means Kleenex electronic money is always sold at a discount in the secondary 
market. This is due  to the reason that both electronic monies in these scenarios are 
identical in every aspect except the fact that one is global and the other is local. In other 
words, no matter how small the relocation probability is, Kleenex electronic money will 
always be sold at a discount; the discount is going to be heavier (q smaller) when the 
relocation possibility becomes larger. All other qualitative behavior of Sm, Sk and q with 
respect to p is similar to the loglinear utility case. 
 
6. Conclusions and Extensions 
We present a model with two types of private electronic currencies that display 
transactional advantages and dominate fiat money in rate of return. One of these 
electronic currencies is a local electronic currency in the following sense: it is accepted 
only in one network. However, in spite of these different returns, the two electronic 
currencies and fiat money circulate in equilibrium. 
The type of electronic currencies introduced in this paper has the important 
property that it is not a surrogate of fiat money. It departs from the banknotes present in 
the financial system during the 19
th century and looks forward to a next stage to be 
introduced soon in electronic commerce: electronic micropayments. We also offer insight 
on how payments are settled in such networks and how a clearinghouse shall be designed 
and regulated within the financial and payments system. This poses new and interesting 
challenges for both lawmakers and policy makers. 
In this model of the payments system, debt takes the form of electronic currency 
issued by firms, and it is settled with a bundle of commodities produced by the issuer in a 
decentralized network, instead of being settled with fiat money. In this early version of 
the model, issuers of debt are committed to repay, and there is no uncertainty in their 
future stream of profits. However, the introduction of this type of uncertainty in the 
economy would imply a role to be played by the monetary authority. In addition, even in 
this simple version of the model, clearing and supervision of a secondary market for 
electronic currencies proves to be welfare improving and implies that the monetary 
authority could play a central role.   30 
We do observe that the local electronic currency can be sold with a premium or 
with a discount, depending on E-money producers’ relative capital intensity, E-monies’ 
redemption rates, and the probability of relocation faced by the agents in this economy. 
Compared to that of Microsoft producer, the more capital intensive of Kleenex 
producer’s production, the higher this discount; the smaller Kleenex money’s redemption 
rate, the higher this discount; The higher the probability of relocation, the higher this 
discount and the lower the share of the local electronic currency in the young creditors’ 
portfolio. 
A natural extension, already mentioned, would be the introduction of uncertainty 
in the future stream of profits of the firms issuing electronic currency. In addition, a 
deeper study of the technical characteristics of the network will soon follow. Another 
extension would be the introduction of a new transactional advantage of electronic 
currency, by allowing consumers to have privacy and anonymity in specific types of 
transactions. 
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